Publications
Empirical Studies
The struggle for identity in doctoral supervision: a phenomenologically grounded qualitative study of power and conflict
Studies in Higher Education
This paper provides an original perspective on the lived experiences of STEM doctoral students concerning their interactions with Principal Investigators, revealing insights into the often-overlooked dynamics of these relationships. While doctoral supervision is commonly seen as a nurturing process, our qualitative research exposes it as a space of conflict, control, and, at its worst, a kind of psychological hell. These findings dismantle the comforting narrative of mentorship, revealing a darker, more unsettling reality at the heart of academia; the supervisory relationship is a warzone of identity, where students are often reshaped into versions of themselves that they no longer recognize in three distinct ways. In the first way, the ‘surveilled self’, students are subject to a relentless sense of observation, creating a defensive, hyper-vigilant state. Second, in the ‘overwritten self’, students’ own identities are obliterated, subsumed by their supervisors’ demands and expectations until they can no longer recognize themselves. Finally, the ‘censored self’ embodies a profound silencing, where students suppress their authentic thoughts and emotions. We arrived at these insights by employing a novel methodological approach, Phenomenologically Grounded Qualitative Research (PGQR), which applies philosophical phenomenology to reveal the existential pressures shaping student identity. By focusing on underlying structures of consciousness, PGQR allowed us to capture the hidden, intense dimensions of conflict and dependency within supervisory relationships, offering a depth of understanding that traditional qualitative methods might overlook.
The Lived Experience of Mortality in Cancer Care: A Phenomenologically Grounded Qualitative Study of Being-Towards-Death
Qualitative Health Research.
This paper presents findings from qualitative interviews with 19 cancer patients and survivors, examining how they experience and articulate the existential structure Heidegger calls being-towards-death. The study accomplishes two goals. First, it responds to the widespread misinterpretation of Heidegger in contemporary death studies, palliative care, and psycho-oncology. While existing research often treats being-towards-death as a vague metaphor or rhetorical gesture, this study takes Heidegger’s account as a serious philosophical framework. Our team-composed largely of phenomenological philosophers-integrated his concepts into every stage of inquiry, from the design of interview protocols to the interpretation of participant narratives. We also employed an original qualitative method, presented in a form that is clear and transferable to future research. Second, we show how engaging Heidegger’s account as a substantial framework has direct and unsettling implications for clinical care. If care is to address the human being-not merely stabilize the body-then two practices must be reconsidered. First, the collapse of meaning following diagnosis should not automatically be pathologized, but recognized as a possible opening to authentic existence. Second, symbolic reframing, legacy projects, and spiritual reassurance are not neutral forms of support. They function to deny death’s finality and re-anchor the patient in social norms just as those norms begin to lose their hold. Rather than fostering resilience, these strategies may interrupt the one moment when patients can begin to live-and die-on their own terms.
Methods Papers
The Phenomenological Reduction in Qualitative Research and Phenomenology: Bytautas and Husserl.
International Journal of Qualitative Methods. In press.
The phenomenological and eidetic reductions have long been misunderstood and misused in qualitative research, hindering cumulative and cooperative progress. To restore conceptual clarity and to reframe any possible use of the reductions within qualitative inquiry, this paper advances a three-step remedy. First, because current difficulties stem from proliferating divergent interpretations, I return to Edmund Husserl’s own descriptions to establish a historical and conceptual baseline. I provide an orthodox, succinct, and practical outline of Husserl’s phenomenological and eidetic reductions. Second, I shift from Husserl’s account of the reductions to the uptake of these reductions in qualitative research. I specifically unpack one example, where the reductions are mischaracterized, by critically engaging Marius Bytautas’s recent article in this journal, “What is Reduction in Phenomenology, Really?”. I show that Bytautas describes the reduction in such vague ways that his account can offer no methodological guidance. I also demonstrate that Bytautas presents what he takes to be the outcome of the reduction – essences – in ways that contradict or confuse central phenomenological terms and insights. Third, I situate Bytautas’ difficulties within the broader literature, showing that his problems are not anomalies, but reflect recurring challenges in attempts to operationalize phenomenological reductions for empirical research. Using Bytautas as a case in point, I highlight how these difficulties arise when phenomenological reductions are asked to bear incompatible demands within qualitative inquiry. I conclude by indicating more viable ways phenomenological insights can be taken up in qualitative research without reproducing the analytic breakdown evident in Bytautas’ reconstruction.
An introduction to phenomenology in qualitative education research: A critical reading of ‘Understanding things from within’
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
This paper examines the relationship between philosophical phenomenology and its application in qualitative educational research, with a specific focus on Edwin Creely’s 2018 article, “Understanding Things from Within”. This analysis accomplishes two goals. First, I engage directly with Creely’s text to present a more careful interpretation of Husserl’s phenomenology and its potential role in qualitative research. In doing so, I identify key errors in Creely’s reading of Husserl, mistakes in his methodological application, and shortcomings of his empirical findings. Second, I situate Creely’s misapplication within a broader discussion of why misinterpretations of Husserl’s phenomenology persist in qualitative education research. By using Creely as a case study, I identify underlying reasons for common errors in the application of Husserl’s methods and core concepts. I conclude by pointing to a more viable approach that avoids the methodological and conceptual pitfalls frequently found in Creely’s work and similar studies.
Max van Manen’s Counterfeit Husserl
Forum: Qualitative Social Research. Forthcoming.
Recent debates in qualitative research emphasize that methods are not merely collections of techniques, but socially stabilized ways of making knowledge claims intelligible. This paper intervenes at this meta-methodological level by examining what it means for a qualitative method to claim philosophical grounding. Rather than evaluating empirical results, the analysis asks under what conditions an appeal to a philosophical source can function as a genuine grounding relation. Specifically, the case examined is Max van Manen’s phenomenological methodology, which presents Edmund Husserl as a point of departure. Through textual analysis of how van Manen presents Husserl’s accounts of the epoché, transcendental reduction, and intentionality, the paper shows that van Manen systematically misrepresents Husserl’s own concepts. Because the figure named “Husserl” no longer corresponds to Husserl’s own project, van Manen’s method cannot claim Husserlian grounding and cannot serve as a basis for researchers who seek such grounding themselves.
Clark Moustaka’s Husserl
The Qualitative Report.
This paper critically examines Clark Moustakas’s presentation of Husserl in Phenomenological Research Methods. I argue that Moustakas’s account misrepresents two core elements of Husserl’s phenomenology – intentionality and the transcendental reduction – in ways that can compromise the foundations of qualitative phenomenological research. First, Moustakas treats intentional meaning as something private, located within the individual, rather than as given in the world. This misreading can sever the connection between experience and a shared world of meaning, possibly leaving qualitative researchers unable to clarify participants’ accounts beyond private expression. Second, Moustakas reduces the transcendental reduction to introspective reflection, overlooking its function as a method for revealing how experience becomes meaningful at all. This robs qualitative inquiry of the tool it needs to examine the conditions of experience. Together, these misinterpretations remove both the philosophical grounding and the methodological framework that make qualitative phenomenological inquiry possible.
The Risks of Phenomenology in Qualitative Research
The Qualitative Report.
This paper accomplishes two goals. First, it diagnoses the risks of importing phenomenological methods and concepts into qualitative research. Phenomenological methods introduce inherent risks, because their aims are structurally misaligned with qualitative inquiry, while the risks of using phenomenological concepts are contingent, stemming from misinterpretation and the lack of a guiding framework. Second, it prescribes how phenomenology can be integrated more productively by retiring Husserl’s methods as study procedures and adopting a concept-led framework that aligns phenomenological insights with empirical aims. This framework offers a clearer and more coherent basis for phenomenological qualitative research.